Writing the economic history of Ireland since independence by McLaughlin, Eoin
1 
 
Review Article:  
Writing the economic history of Ireland since independence  
Eoin McLaughlin, University of St. Andrews 
Andy Bielenberg and Raymond Ryan, An Economic History of Ireland since 
Independence (London: Routledge, 2013, 282 pp, $145 hardback). 
 
After its heyday of the cliometric debates in the 1970s and 1980s (including Joel Mokyr’s 
Why Ireland starved), economic history was perceived as being in the doldrums in the 1990s and 
early 2000s.1 With history taking a cultural turn and mainstream economics focusing on theory 
and econometrics, the future looked bleak for economic history.2 Yet, economic history has seen 
something of a resurgence in recent years, due in part to the turbulent economic climate. As 
Barry Eichengreen noted in his Presidential address to the Economic History Association in 
2011, the 2008 crisis ‘was a good crisis for economic history’, with increased reference to past 
financial crises and to the Great Depression in the popular press.3  
In recent years, the subject of economic history in Ireland also looked to be in terminal 
decline. Retirements of leading scholars of the study of Irish economic history (Cormac Ó Gráda 
from UCD, Liam Kennedy from Queen’s Belfast, and Frank Geary from University of Ulster) 
coincided with the departure from the island of one of the disciplines leading practitioners (Kevin 
O’Rourke from TCD to Oxford), all of which seemed to place the discipline in a precarious 
position. However, in Ireland too there has been somewhat of a resurgence in the study of 
economic history, with scholars, old and new based both in Ireland and further afield, engaged in 
research. Economic history, as a discipline, is inherently inter-disciplinary and current 
practitioners are found in various university departments and schools, including history, 
economics, management, sociology and geography. A noteworthy development has occurred in 
Queen’s Belfast, home of the first chair in Irish economic history, where a shift in research 
activity has taken place, from its ‘traditional’ place in the School of History to the Management 
School,4 which now hosts a centre for economic history and is home to a number of economic 
and financial historians.5 
In this context – the decline and rise of economic history in Ireland –  this review aims, first 
and foremost, to outline the importance of the Bielenberg and Ryan contribution to the study of 
                                                          
1 This is illustrated in terms of the falling success of economic historians on the academic labour market in 
the 1990s and early 2000s: Graham Brownlow, ‘How do we Ensure a Useful Future for Irish 
Cliometrics?’, Irish Economic and Social History, 39 (2012), p. 97. 
2 For example see Peter Temin’s autobiographical account of the rise and fall of economic history at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where economic history used to be part of a triumvirate in the 
economics programme but was displaced by theory and econometrics: Peter Temin, ‘The Rise and Fall of 
Economic History at MIT’, History of Political Economy, 46:1 (2014), pp 337-359. 
3 Barry Eichengreen, ‘Economic History and Economic Policy’, The Journal of Economic History, 72:2 
(2012), p.291. 
4 Until about 20 years ago, standalone economic and social history departments were the norm in the UK 
but these have since merged with history, economics and wider social science departments.   
5 Queen’s University Centre for Economic History was founded in 2012 by John Turner 
(http://www.quceh.org.uk/). 
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Ireland’s economic past. Andy Bielenberg is the leading economic and business historian of 
Ireland currently engaged with the subject of Irish economic development and the history of the 
Irish economy.6 The following essay focuses on some key themes and outlines contributions of 
the Bielenberg and Ryan’s survey, as well as suggesting avenues for future research. An 
additional aim of the review is to highlight how the ‘historiography’ of Irish economic history of 
the twentieth century has evolved through a comparison of the current work with other seminal 
texts that also explicitly set out to study the Irish economy since the 1920s: Meenan to the 1970s, 
Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh through the 1980s, and Ó Gráda up to the 1990s.7 Comparing 
texts written at different points in time shows both how the discipline has evolved and also how 
each author perceived future developments in the economy itself.8  
The latest instalment in the economic history of Ireland since the 1920s  
An Economic History of Ireland since Independence is an excellent overview of research on the 
Irish economy and is a comprehensive survey of Irish economic history from the 1920s up to the 
present day. Structurally the book is divided into three sections: firstly, a chronological narrative 
of the Irish economy, followed by a sectoral analysis (agricultural, industry and services) and 
finally a section on economy policy and demographics. In terms of structure, Bielenberg and 
Ryan follow the established pattern in the body of literature noted above. This is a book that 
should be compulsory reading for social science and humanities students of Ireland.  
Bielenberg and Ryan provide a very useful compendium of data in various tables throughout 
the text, with additional tables incorporated in appendices. All counted there are 67 tables 
included in the volume; these range from tables on conventional subjects such as ‘budgetary 
stance and government debt (2.2)’, to those on more recent concerns like the ‘value of loans 
transferred to NAMA (7.7)’, and include topics of greater social and demographic interest, for 
example ‘net migration rates from 1926-2011 (8.3)’. A very useful resource is provided by the 
statistical tables in the appendices, most notably table 1 which gives an annual series of GDP per 
capita for Ireland compared to the UK and 29 Western European Countries. However, a 
reservation for this reviewer is the unquestioning use of Angus Maddison’s GDP data 
throughout the book and its conclusions and also in the appendices.9 Although a standard 
macroeconomic dataset, Maddison’s data is not without its critics.10 The unquestioning adoption 
of Maddison data by Irish economic historians in recent years is somewhat surprising.11 As 
                                                          
6 Prior to An Economic History of Ireland since Independence, Bielenberg produced an excellent volume on 
Ireland and the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century: Andy Bielenberg, Ireland and the Industrial 
Revolution: the Impact of the Industrial Revolution on Irish Industry, 1801-1922 (London, 2009). 
7 James Meenan, The Irish Economy since 1922 (Liverpool 1970); Kieran A. Kennedy, Thomas Giblin and 
Deirdre McHugh, The Economic Development of Ireland in the Twentieth Century (London 1988); Cormac Ó 
Gráda, A Rocky Road: the Irish Economy since the 1920s (Manchester, 1997). 
8 A notable exclusion are the works of Louis Cullen, this is a conscious decision as Louis’s frame of 
reference extends back to the 1600s! 
9 For example, in the introduction Bielenberg and Ryan praise the historical Maddison data for making 
inter-temporal comparison possible, noting how ‘in the wake of the 2008 economic collapse, a somewhat 
more sober perspective on recent growth and decline emerged, which can now be placed in an appropriate 
historical context going back to the 1920s using Maddison’s data for GDP per capita and the ESRI 
historical series for GDP and GNP (see appendices)’, p. 2. 
10 Clark (in a somewhat negative review) opined on Maddison’s data: ‘any economist with enough street 
savvy to resist fabulous riches offered by unknown Nigerians over the internet will equally want to steer 
clear of these estimates.’ : G. Clark. ‘Review of Contours of the World Economy’, Journal of Economic 
History, 69:4 (2009), p. 1160. 
11 Although Barry and Daly note that no official accounts exist, they make explicit use of Maddison’s data, 
which they say is derived from ‘a variety of sources’ and note how it ‘records 1933 as  Ireland’s worst year, 
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Kennedy et al. noted, writing in 1988, ‘the only national income figures covering the period are 
the unofficial estimates of G. A. Duncan’ and that they made a ‘correction’ to the growth rates of 
real GDP based on those estimates.12 Where did Maddison source the data for Ireland? Scholars 
attempting to replicate Maddison’s Irish estimates will find it difficult given the opaque 
description of his sources. However, closer inspection reveals that for the nineteenth-century his 
estimates of Irish GDP are based on population levels and assume a slower growth rate than the 
rest of the UK.13 Estimates for the early twentieth century are based on K. Kennedy’s estimates 
of GNP, not GDP.14 The Kennedy data, starting in 1926, are a triennial series with annual data 
from 1947 onwards.15  And it is not until 1960 that the Irish series is based on ‘OECD sources’.16 
So what does this mean for Irish economic growth? Table 1 compares the Maddison growth rates 
with growth rates from Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh and it shows that the rates are identical 
(as one would hope!) apart from the last two rows when Maddison begins using alternative data. 
Thus, despite the known limitations of the early Irish GDP/GNP data, no alternative data set 
has been constructed in the past 15 years.17 Furthermore, neither are the more recent Irish data in 
the early 1990s sacrosanct; for example, Ó Gráda’s discussion of contemporary critiques of Irish 
GDP data, such as Jim O’Leary who quipped that Irish GDP estimates had the same ‘empirical 
status as moving statues, flying saucers and the statue-of-Elvis-found-on-Mars stories’.18 Given 
these concerns, it may have been instructive to illustrate to students how National Accounting 
came into being in the 1930s, during the Great Depression, and how and when Ireland began its 
own official estimates.19 
Table 1: Comparing growth rates: Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh versus Maddison  
 Kennedy, Giblin, McHugh growth rates of real 
product 
Maddison growth rates 
 Total real 
product 
Total 
population 
Real 
product per 
capita 
Total real 
product 
Total 
population 
Real 
product 
per capita 
1926-38 1.3 -0.1 1.4 1.3 -0.1 1.4 
1938-50 1.1 0.1 1.0 1.1 0.1 1.0 
1950-60 1.7 -0.5 2.2 1.7 -0.5 2.2 
1960-73 4.4 0.6 3.8 4.4 0.6 3.8 
1973-85 1.7 1.2 0.5 3.8 1.2 2.6 
1926-85 2.1 0.3 1.8 2.5 0.3 2.2 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
when real GDP fell back to the level previously attained in 1929’ for their study of the Great Depression in 
Ireland. Frank Barry and Mary E. Daly, ‘Irish Perceptions of the Great Depression’, IIIS Discussion Paper 
XXXX. no. 349 (2011), p. 2. 
12 Kennedy et al., The Economic Development of Ireland, pp 53-54 (endnote 22). 
13 Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992 (Paris, 1995), p. 135; Angus Maddison, The 
World Economy in the 20th Century (Paris, 1989), pp115-116. 
14 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris, 2003), p. 29. 
15 Kieran A. Kennedy, Productivity and Industrial Growth (Oxford, 1971), table 1.2, p. 3. 
16 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: a Millennial Perspective (Paris, 2001), p.178. 
17 An exception of course are the estimates of regional UK GDP by Geary & Stark; however, these are 
primarily nineteenth century estimates:  Frank Geary and Tom Stark, ‘Examining Ireland’s Post-Famine 
Economic Growth Performance’, Economic Journal , 112 (2002) .Frank Geary and Tom Stark, ‘Regional 
GDP in the UK, 1861-1911: new estimates’, Economic History Review, 68:1 (2015). 
18 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road p. 33. 
19 For example, see L. M. Cullen, ‘The Context and Development of Historical National Accounts in 
Ireland’, Irish Economic and Social History, 37 (2010), pp 75-84; and the discussion in Frank Geary and Tom 
Stark, ‘150 years of Regional GDP: United Kingdom’, in Juan Roses and Niko Wolf (eds), The Economic 
Development of Europe's Regions: A Quantitative History since 1900. Forthcoming 2015. 
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Sources: Kieran A. Kennedy, Thomas Giblin and Deirdre McHugh, The Economic Development of Ireland, 
table 6.1; Maddison data set: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm 
In addition to the data tables, Bielenberg and Ryan’s survey also provides a comprehensive  
bibliography of Irish economic history (25 pp) that will be an invaluable starting point for future 
scholars researching the history of Ireland’s economy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
The bibliography – arranged by official publications, newspaper(s) (Irish Times) and secondary 
works (published and unpublished) – also provides an insight into the current state of twentieth-
century Irish economic history. Figure 1 illustrates the year of publication/production of 
secondary works cited in the bibliography. Unsurprisingly perhaps,20 the works cited mainly date 
from the 1980s onwards and increase towards the present day, suggesting a healthy level of 
scholarly output. However, when the citations are categorised by major economic history field 
journal,21 it is evident there are remarkably few citations from these journals. In contrast Irish 
Economic and Social History journal is cited 14 times, the Economic and Social Review receives 17 
citations and the Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society has 22 citations; furthermore 
peer-reviewed economic journals – including the previous two journals but excluding Central 
Bank Quarterly and ESRI commentary – are cited 49 times. In all, this might indicate that 
scholars of the Irish economy have preference for a domestic audience, but more importantly this 
also suggests that studies relating to the modern Irish economy are published in general interest 
economic journals. It must also be noted that there are a large number of monographs (149) and 
essays in edited collections cited, which may partially explain the low number of peer-reviewed 
journal articles. Also, unlike the several PhD theses cited by Bielenberg in his study of the 
nineteenth-century economy,22 there are no PhD theses cited in this survey; only a UUC MPhil 
thesis from 2000 is cited. Thus, overall the bibliographic citations suggest that the study of the 
Irish economy in the twentieth century is ripe for exploration, especially in the cliometric 
tradition.  
 
Figure 1: Bibliography citations by year of publication 
 
                                                          
20 Bielenberg and Ryan (p. 1) note that there was limited academic interest in the economic history of 
Ireland prior to the 1970s. 
21 The major field journals, Journal of Economic History, Economic History Review, Explorations in Economic 
History, Journal of European Economic History, European Review of Economic History, Financial History Review, 
are cited 1,2,0,0,1,1 times respectively 
22 Andy Bielenberg, Ireland and the Industrial Revolution, p. 250-251. 
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Bielenberg and Ryan, An Economic History of Ireland since Independence, bibliography ‘secondary sources’, pp 
252-271. 
In terms of the battle for hearts and minds, economic history, and economics more generally, 
has often been deemed to be a dull subject due to its rigorous use of data and writing on topics 
that do not attract the attention of the layman as other more visual forms of history might; there 
are no gory battles or political intrigues dissected here. However, in terms of presentation, this 
reviewer feels that the Bielenberg and Ryan volume misses a trick so to speak. With the 
exception of the colourful front cover – ‘Dublin: Fly there by Aer Lingus’ advertising poster by 
Guus Melai – Bielenberg and Ryan miss an opportunity to catch the attention of their audience 
with the use of relevant images and cartoons such as was done by Ó Gráda.23 In this respect, the 
presentation of the book itself is more in line with Meenan and Kennedy et al. The richness of 
material and visual culture available for the study of twentieth and twenty-first century economic 
history would be particularly striking in making comparisons over time and space and illustrating 
developments in areas such as advertisements and public tastes and preferences.  
Textual comparison and notes 
Both Meenan and Kennedy et al. are explicitly texts on the economic development of Ireland 
that trace development since the foundation of the State, whereas the Ó Gráda and Bielenberg 
and Ryan surveys are unequivocally economic history texts. Thus, as the comparison of Ó Gráda 
and Bielenberg and Ryan with Meenan and Kennedy et al. may be deemed unfair, it is necessary 
to briefly outline the motivation for choosing these texts.  In fact, within economics there is a 
very close link between the sub-fields of economic development and economic history, which 
                                                          
23 There are 26 illustrations in Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road. 
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warrant the inclusion of both texts here.24 Moreover, Meenan and Kennedy et al. are widely 
cited by explicit economic history studies, such as Johnson and Daly.25 The choice of texts is also 
indicative of the shift of the study of Ireland’s economic history from economists to historians.  
From casual observation on the four texts, a noticeable difference is the time span used. In 
essence, all of the authors use a canvass of (roughly) a 100-year period. For Meenan, this means 
looking back to the 1800s, coincidentally so too do Kennedy et al. and Ó Gráda; whereas 
Bielenberg and Ryan do not delve further than the foundation of the State. Furthermore, and 
perhaps unsurprisingly, each of the texts appears stronger on their respective recent histories than 
on events in the more distant past, perhaps indicating the power of memory when recalling 
recent historical events. This is important, as it means each text is a valuable aid when studying 
the whole of the period since independence, and even before, as each covers aspects that may be 
overlooked by the others. For example, Meenan reminds us that there was no simple teleological 
narrative towards free trade in Ireland from the 1950s onwards and that there were objections, 
although these he dismissed as ‘spurious emotionalism that criticised the [1965 Anglo-Irish 
Trade Area] Agreement as a new Act of Union’.26 Moreover, the influence of the contemporary 
economic environment is evident in all of the works. For Kennedy et al., they were noticeably 
influenced by the negative outlook of the 1980s as can be seen from their conclusion: ‘as we 
conclude our study, unemployment and the national debt are at all-time high levels, living 
standards are depressed, substantial emigration has resumed, and the future outlook is 
problematic’.27 Ó Gráda, on the other hand, was more bullish writing in the early years of the 
Celtic Tiger, although he was ‘guardedly optimistic’ when summarising Ireland’s progress and 
prospects in the mid-1990s. In his conclusion he stated that  
‘since then [1980s], it is Ireland’s fast economic growth that has captured the 
headlines, though admittedly a growth which was slow to create employment at 
first…But are recent trends in the South simply compensation for all the spare 
capacity created by bad policy in the late 1970s? Are they the product of the fiscal 
medicine of the mid-1980s, or do they stem instead from EU structural funds and 
distortionary transfers to farmers and industrialists? Are they the fruit of three 
decades of commitment to outward-orientated economic policies, affecting both 
commodity and factor movements? Or do they mark the beginning of a new higher-
growth steady state for the Southern economy? Only time can tell.’ 28  
Bielenberg and Ryan are also influenced by contemporary developments, most evident in 
chapter 7 (discussed below).  
One of the most noticeable differences between the Bielenberg and Ryan approach is the 
absence of Northern Ireland. In Meenan, Kennedy et al., and Ó Gráda, Northern Ireland 
features prominently and it is also a direct source of comparison, whereas it is purposefully 
                                                          
24 E.g., see Peter Temin, ‘The Black Death and industrialisation: lessons for today’s South’, VoxEU blog, 4 
June 2014: http://www.voxeu.org/article/economic-history-and-economic-development 
25 David Johnson, The Interwar Economy in Ireland (Dublin 1985) and Mary Daly, Industrial Development and 
Irish National Identity 1922-1939 (Dublin 1992). 
26 Meenan, The Irish Economy since 1922 ,p. 297. 
27 Kennedy et al., The Economic Development of Ireland, p. 75. 
28 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, p 233-234. 
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overlooked in the current volume.29 Perhaps the exclusion of Northern Ireland represents a post 
Good Friday Agreement shift in the boundaries of scholarship, whereby the study of Irish 
economic history is conducted along partitioned lines between north and south? However, this is 
unlikely as attested by the recent edited volume by Kennedy and Ollerenshaw that explicitly 
focused on the province of Ulster but also contained references to the rest of the island.30 The 
exclusion of reference to Northern Ireland is also somewhat at odds with Bielenberg’s study of 
nineteenth century Ireland, where he argued against analysing the counties that became 
Northern Ireland in isolation from the rest of the island because ‘occlusion of the rest of the 
island placed the east Ulster experience firmly in the British fold and underwrote a version of 
Irish economic history in which a form of economic partition had taken place long before the 
1920s’.31 In that case Bielenberg argued that:  
‘a 32 county/all Ireland perspective has been adopted as the focus of this book, not 
for any political reasons, but because official statistics on industry in this period 
cover the whole island as a component of the UK, which makes it a better unit of 
analysis than the province of Ulster, the six counties which became Northern 
Ireland, or the 26 southern counties which became the Irish Free State. Moreover, 
the relationship of industrialists in Dublin and Cork in this period to Britain in terms 
of trade, technology, the implementation of the factory acts, and so on, was broadly 
similar to those located in Belfast.’32  
The ‘occlusion’ of Northern Ireland in Bielenberg and Ryan is a missed opportunity as 
Northern Ireland offers a comparison – almost a natural experiment – to validate points such as 
the importance of government policy in (the Republic of) Ireland versus similar or absent policies 
in Northern Ireland; for example, how does Brownlow’s case study of FDI in the North (the De 
Lorean debacle) compare with the lauded IDA in the south?33 Furthermore the separation of 
North and South in 1920 illustrated trading activity (or lack thereof) within the island of Ireland 
and could be the basis of further studies.34 More recent accounts of the economic history of 
Northern Ireland in the twentieth century are explicitly comparative, not only with the south of 
the island but also Europe wide. Perhaps future studies on the economic history of Ireland could 
at the very least take an island wide approach rather than a narrow ‘State’ focus.  
The chronological narrative of Bielenberg and Ryan stresses the importance of joining the 
EEC/EU as a key structural break in Irish economic history (e.g., p. 26). The authors quite 
rightly point to the ‘windfall transfers from Brussels’ as evidence and the gradual diversification 
of exports (p.27); however, this view tends to overlook the exact timing of changes. Ireland was 
exposed to free trade with Britain for the first time since the Economic War following the 1965 
                                                          
29 The titles of all the volumes studied contain reference to Ireland but only Bielenberg and Ryan 
specifically state that their book refers to ‘independent’ Ireland. The other volumes have titles that do not 
fully reflect their central focus on the south of the island. 
30 Liam Kennedy and Philip Ollerenshaw (eds). Ulster since 1600 (Oxford 2013); although this volume was 
broader in scope than the earlier volume edited by Kennedy & Ollerenshaw: Liam Kennedy and Philip 
Ollerenshaw (eds), An Economic History of Ulster 1820-1939 (Manchester, 1985). 
31 Andy Bielenberg, Ireland and the Industrial Revolution, p. 2. 
32 Ibid, p. 7. 
33 Graham Brownlow, ‘Back to the Failure: An Analytical Narrative of the De Lorean Debacle’, Business 
History, 57 (2015). 
34 E.g., different interpretations of internal trade: David Johnson, The Interwar Economy in Ireland (Dublin 
1985) and Philip Ollerenshaw, ‘Business and Finance, 1780-1945’ in Liam Kennedy and Philip 
Ollerenshaw (eds.). Ulster since 1600 (Oxford, 2013), p. 188. 
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Anglo-Irish agreement. In that sense, as Kennedy et al. argue, trends towards free(r) trade were 
evident prior to the joining of the EU. Moreover, Kennedy et al. did not share the same 
optimistic portrayal of Ireland’s entry into the EEC, suggesting that performance after entry did 
not live up to the hype.35 In other respects EEC/EU entry was more of a reversion to pre-
independence (i.e. UK) conditions: free trade, monetary union and fiscal transfers. This in turn 
begs the question: was independence important? The timeline of free trade – protection - free 
trade in the book is somewhat appealing but on the other hand leaves some questions 
unanswered. The encouragement of inefficient (uneconomic) manufacturing of the 1930s in 
many respects harks back to policies introduced when Ireland was part of the UK. The 
Congested Districts Board, established in 1891, subsidised uneconomic industries that collapsed 
once support was withdrawn.36 The industries of the 1930s apparently experienced a similar fate. 
Why did policy makers not learn from the past?  
Eichengreen and Boltho have challenged the conventional wisdom that growing European 
integration was responsible for development patterns by adopting counterfactual alternatives to 
the various aspects of the European project.37 Essentially their study is an application of the 
Coase Theorem, as they assume that if outcomes were of benefit an alternative means to achieve 
the outcome would have been possible (e.g., bilateral trade negotiations etc.). Their bottom line 
is that the European project possibly increased European GDP by as much/little as 5 per cent 
compared to a non-EEC/EU counterfactual.38 In this context, it would have been interesting to 
see a similar exercise practiced for Ireland: was EU membership all it was cracked up to be? 
Furthermore, entry into the EEC/EU also coincides with the break-up of the post-World War II 
international monetary system (Bretton Woods) and the ushering in of an era of floating 
exchange rates and capital mobility. Perhaps the changing international monetary system, 
combined with Ireland abandoning its historical links with Sterling (and opting for EMS, floating 
exchange rates and subsequent Eurozone), is an equally significant break, especially given the 
recent financial turmoil. The changed international monetary landscape has proved to be more 
turbulent and is also a key factor in the financial expansion of the 2000s. 
FDI is also a theme that Bielenberg and Ryan highlight, showing the significance of low 
corporation tax (as well as EU membership) as a successful policy in attracting FDI to Ireland (p. 
149), a policy that continues to attract the ire of Ireland’s European partners.39 Yet the question 
remains why was this policy adopted so late in the Free State’s existence? And were efforts not 
taken before this? Delaware, the incorporation capital of the United States, has followed a 
similar path since the early 1900s by stealing a march on neighbouring New Jersey.40 Had this 
                                                          
35 Kennedy et al, The Economic Development of Ireland, pp 82-83. 
36 E.g., see discussion in Joseph Lee, The Modernisation of Irish Society 1848-1918. (Dublin, 1973, 2008), p. 
128. 
37 Barry Eichengreen and Andrea Boltho, ‘The Economic Impact of European Integration’ in Stephen 
Broadberry and Kevin O’Rourke (eds.), Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe (Cambridge 2010), pp 
267-295. 
38 Ibid, p. 294. 
39 E.g., Ireland’s low corporation tax under threat from Germany, Irish Independent 10 October 2013: 
http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/irelands-low-corporation-tax-under-threat-from-germany-
29650012.html 
40 The following excerpt from the American Law Review in 1899 depicted Delaware’s corporate policies in a 
particularly negative light: “[Delaware] consists of a few clay hills and sand bars nearly surrounded by 
water… the little community of truck-farmers and clam diggers have had their cupidity by the spectacle of 
their northern neighbour New Jersey, becoming rich and bloated through the granting of franchises to 
trusts which are to do business everywhere except New Jersey… Little Delaware, gangrened with envy…is 
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path to success been overlooked before the 1970s? Was it simply unavailable or was it obscured 
by protectionist policies? Kennedy et al. argued that FDI in the inter-war era was simply not 
available.41 Thus, this suggests that the supply of FDI was as important as the demand and the 
ability to attract FDI. Furthermore, Kennedy et al. were highly critical of the FDI approach and 
compared it unfavourably to the protectionist policies of the 1930s, implying that it was a short-
term fix.42 Yet, Ó Gráda notes the use of Singer sewing machines by Peter Tait in Limerick to 
produce ready-made clothes and that Ireland was a ‘world pioneer in this industry’.43 This 
implies that Ireland may have been a recipient of a form of FDI pre-1920s from Singer, a 
company that Mira Wilkins describes as the ‘first American international business’ that 
manufactured overseas to avoid duties.44 A more nuanced study of the drivers of FDI over time 
may help unravel some of these questions in future research. 
Demographic transition and human capital accumulation over time are other important 
themes that emanate from Bielenberg and Ryan. This is interesting considering the discussion in 
the other texts. Although the term human capital was not explicitly used by Meenan, he 
bemoaned the shortage of skilled labour in Ireland and the subsequent brain drain.45 So did 
Kennedy et al., who lamented how little attention had been paid to human capital accumulation 
in Ireland and how instead policy had focused on more conventional aspects of capital 
accumulation.46 Somewhat differently, Ó Gráda stressed the importance of human capital 
accumulation since the 1950s and 60s, optimistically concluding that the accumulation of human 
capital by both polities on the island would ‘stand them in good stead’.47 However, he too was 
also critical of the subsidisation of education and the subsequent brain drain ‘of graduates in 
medicine, engineering and architecture’. Given the drain, Ó Gráda also questioned State funding 
of tertiary education, a policy criticised as being used to capture floating middle class votes, given 
the drain and asked whether in the 1980s and 90s ‘the brightest of the best-educated [have] been 
the most prone to leave’?48 Moreover, Bielenberg and Ryan appear to equate human capital with 
educational attainment,49 however, in theory human capital encapsulates on-the-job training as 
well as formal and informal education. In this respect, it would be interesting to determine what 
were the drivers of human capital accumulation in Ireland and how those determinants relate to 
recent cross-country datasets such as Morrison and Murtin.50 Also, human capital can refer to 
quantity as well as quality. Perhaps an alternative perspective on educational attainment (i.e. 
human capital in the view of Bielenberg and Ryan) is that institutions undermined the quality of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
determined to get her little tiny, sweet, round, baby hand into the grab-bag of sweet things before it is too 
late. [Delaware has enacted] a general corporation and trust law, which beats that of New Jersey “all 
holler”…And it looks as if the exports of that little State will consist for the future of charters and peaches 
in about equal quantities.’ Quoted in William E. Kirk, III, ‘A Case Study in Legislative Opportunism: 
How Delaware used the Federal-State System to Attain Corporate Pre-Eminence’, Journal of Corporate Law, 
10 (1) (1984), p. 254. 
41 Kennedy et al., The Economic Development of Ireland, p. 195 
42 Ibid, p. 240, 247 
43 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, p. 51. 
44 Mira Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from the Colonial Era to 
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human capital accumulation through various educational reforms for example the introduction 
of Irish as a core part of primary and secondary curriculum at the expense of other disciplines, 
maths and science in particular. More recently, the introduction of project maths has been linked 
with grade inflation and poor performance in third level courses with math modules.51 
An interesting chapter which highlights the impact of recent years on the direction of 
scholarship is chapter 7, ‘investment and credit in Irish economic development’. In contrast to 
what Meenan dubbed the ‘enviable record of stability’ and to Ó Gráda’s observation that the 
Irish banking system ‘lacked dynamism but it proved very stable’, whereby no Irish bank had 
failed since 1885,52 Bielenberg and Ryan highlight the instability of the financial sector in the 
early twenty-first century. Chapter 7 is also a departure from previous works, most notably 
Kennedy et al. and Ó Gráda,53 by highlighting the role of the expanding financial system; 
notably, for example, the origins of the ill-fated Anglo-Irish Bank are discussed despite its relative 
unimportance until its (over-) expansion in the late 1990s and 2000s. This chapter is a significant 
departure from similar chapters in Kennedy et al., who made no reference to the financial system 
in their discussion on investment, which is framed primarily in terms of fixed capital investment. 
Thus, perhaps understandably, the housing bubble and crash of the 2000s receives a somewhat 
disproportionate amount of discussion (45 percent of the chapter, pp. 156-164) relative to the 
time frame of the book 1920-2012. The discussion of investment is also of interest: in traditional 
studies of capital formation residential housing and dwellings are treated as part of fixed capital 
formation. This would have implications for Irish growth prospects as in the past dwellings 
played a smaller role in fixed capital formation but in the housing bubble years their contribution 
to fixed capital formation increased.54  
What chapter 7 could have done with is some contextualisation and discussion relating to the 
literature on banking and economic growth – e.g., Levine.55 Ireland’s recent banking history 
could also have been given greater context and analysis; Ireland’s banking system emerged from 
the Great Depression unscathed but was unable to overcome the ‘Great Recession’: why? The 
first major bailout of the entire banking sector occurred in 2008; historically speaking, this is 
important. What happened between 1929-33 and 2007-2009 that made the Irish financial system 
so unstable? Meenan, summarising the changes in banking lending from 1939 to 1969, argued 
that ‘the general impression is of a society in which the banking system is progressively less 
concerned with farmers or private individuals and more concerned with manufacturing and 
commerce. It is a society in which the rentier counts for less and the industrial producer and 
trader for more; an economy which is much more greatly monetised than it was even twenty 
years ago.’56 Was it the consolidisation of the banking system? Technological changes (ATMs, 
credit cards, internet banking, etc.)? Was it international capital flows (different monetary regime 
                                                          
51 E.g., Irish Times, 9 June 2015. 
52 James Meenan, The Irish economy since 1922,p. 215; Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, p. 73. 
53 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, notes that nothing had come of the calls for a third banking force since the 
1970s, p. 176 
54 E.g., see table 8.3 in Kennedy et al., The Economic Development of Ireland, where dwellings account for 23 
per cent of fixed investment from 1974-1984. By contrast, in 2005 and 2006 Dwellings accounted for 47 
and 45 per cent of gross domestic physical capital formation at current market prices, at constant prices 
they accounted for 38 and 37 per cent, however the reference year was 2009: 
 http://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/documents/economy/2010/nie2010.pdf   
55 Ross Levine, ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’, Journal of Economic 
Literature 35:2 (1997), pp 688-726; Ross Levine, ‘Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence’, in Philippe 
Aghion and Steven Durlauf (ed), Handbook of Economic Growth (Amsterdam, 2005). 
56 James Meenan, The Irish Economy since 1922, p. 235-236. 
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following the collapse of Bretton Woods)? Was it due to moral hazard (e.g., the treatment of AIB 
as ‘too big to fail’ in the 1980s)?57 Or perhaps the erosion of shareholder liability and the end of 
financial repression as has been suggested by Turner in the case of British banking?58 These are 
all potential interesting questions that are yet to be explored; although, perhaps it is premature to 
undertake historical research on the recent banking crisis without access to the relevant primary 
source material. 
Given the influence of contemporary events, the lack of attention devoted to the issue of 
national debt is somewhat surprising. This was a prominent theme in both Meenan and Kennedy 
et al.59 Ó Gráda notes how economists began to discuss and ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’ in 
the late 1980s and 1990s and how the rate of debt to GDP rose over 60 per cent of GDP in the 
mid-1970s.60 Although government debt to GDP ratios are shown in table 2.2 there is not much 
discussion surrounding this, especially in relation to the Reinhart and Rogoff magic 60 percent 
number.61 Here is a missed opportunity for Bielenberg and Ryan to engage with the recent 
scholarship on sovereign debt crises such as Rienhart and Rogoff.62 How could an Irish story 
play into this? Could a study of Irish economic history offer any insights into the impact of 
sovereign debt on economic performance? Another prominent issue today is inequality in all its 
guises, e.g., interpersonal (income, wealth), regional and cross-country. Meenan, Kennedy et al. 
and Ó Gráda have all looked at regional development and through this it can be seen how 
regional convergence took place, this is an issue which Bielenberg and Ryan have not addressed 
perhaps because the issue is no longer of interest given the regional development that has 
occurred. Income and wealth inequality is also an issue that has gained attention in recent years 
through the work of Piketty and co-authors.63 This is a topic discussed in length by Ó Gráda and 
more recently by John Turner but not tackled by Bielenberg and Ryan;64 it is particularly relevant 
given the uneven distribution of Tiger and bubble growth and subsequent crises. Inequality over 
time is an area that could be addressed in future research endeavours.   
A recurring theme throughout the book is Bielenberg and Ryan’s belief in the importance of 
the State (e.g. ‘the State constitutes a core variable in our interpretation of Irish economic 
history’, p. 5 and ‘beneficial agency of the State’, p. 199). Bielenberg and Ryan might have 
engaged with some leading developments in the field of economic development, in particular the 
various works of Acemoglu and Robinson.65 The central argument of Acemoglu and Robinson is 
the importance of inclusive economic and political institutions for economic growth; whereas 
extractive economic and political institutions are detrimental to growth and development. A 
crucial argument of these authors is that extractive institutions can encourage growth (e.g., 
                                                          
57 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, pp 64-65. 
58 John D. Turner, Banking in Crisis: the Rise and Fall of British Banking Stability, 1800 to Present (Cambridge, 
2014).  
59 Meenan, The Irish Economy since 1922, p. 257; Kennedy et al., The Economic Development of Ireland, pp 90-
91. 
60 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road, p. 32 
61 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’, American Economic Review: 
Papers & Proceedings, 100:2 (2010), pp 573-78. 
62 C. Reinhart and K. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, 2009). 
63 E.g., Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge MA, 2014). 
64 Ó Gráda, A Rocky Road , pp 90-91; John D. Turner, ‘Wealth Concentration in the European Periphery: 
Ireland, 1858–2001’ Oxford Economic Papers, 62:4 (2010), pp 625-646. 
65 The body work of Acemoglu [and Johnson] and Robinson and their underlying theses are effectively 
summarised in Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity 
and Poverty (London, 2012). 
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Fianna Fáil crony-capitalism during the housing boom, or various incidents of localism, 
populism and outright corruption over time) – but that these are not sustainable (e.g., as has been 
shown in recent crises in Ireland).66 Notably, corruption is repeatedly mentioned in Bielenberg 
and Ryan, with explicit reference to the 1990s and 2000s, especially in their conclusions 
regarding the susceptibility of micro-economies to corruption (p.197-198). But if we take 
corruption as given, why does it only appear in the 1990s and 2000s and not before?  
An additional facet of the approach of Acemoglu and Johnson is that they trace the historical 
development of institutions – for example tracing the dual economy of South Africa to legislation 
introduced in 1913. Acemoglu and Johnson argue that critical junctures are important for 
enacting institutional changes and cite the importance of revolutions (Glorious and French). 
Using this paradigm from an Irish perspective would bring a scholar back to political 
arrangements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: for example, the penal laws although 
downplayed by historians through their being inadequately enforced and by the fact there is 
circumstantial evidence of successful Catholic merchants.  However, the penal laws pushed 
Catholics into riskier activities and there is a strong likelihood of both success and failure of 
merchants; hence an explanation for the growth of the professions and the lack of risk taking by 
Irish entrepreneurs. Although Bielenberg and Ryan begin their study from independence they do 
not show how the Irish ‘revolution’ affected institutional changes, unlike Acemoglu and 
Robinson who praise the Glorious Revolution and French Revolutions as ways of injecting 
institutional change. Or did Ireland inherit flawed institutions from the UK and lack the 
understanding/ingenuity to develop them (e.g., UK-inspired unions)? Recent scandals suggest 
limited institutional change (e.g., control of Catholic Church, political dominance of the populist 
Fianna Fáil) and that this may be a factor in Irish economic development over the course of the 
twentieth century. The revolutionary period created new political and economic elites, and as 
many of the revolutionary generation who survived into the 1920s were young, this meant they 
dominated Irish political and economic life well into the twentieth century. Can this be seen as a 
succession of generational elites; from the long-lasting revolutionary generation, to a generation 
of Whitaker inspired institutional developments (e.g., ESRI and IPA), to Fianna Fáil and 
property developers in the late 1990s and 2000s? Meenan focuses on the historical development 
of institutions in Ireland in tune with Acemoglu and Robinson and the important role of 
institutions is noted by Olson, Ó Gráda, Garvin and Brownlow but a thorough economic history 
is still to be undertaken.67 Moreover, the arguments of Acemoglu and Robinson have not gone 
unchallenged, with notable critiques by Peter Temin and Stephen Broadberry, suggesting that 
without the nuanced insights of historians their approach equates to whig history,68 thus 
indicating a fruitful research avenue for future scholars. 
Moreover, given the very abstract discussion of the State, readers may be inclined to 
overlook who actually comprises an economy: individuals and firms are at the core of modern 
economic models and households also play a key role in decision making. This was poignantly 
illustrated by Meenan when concluding his study:  
                                                          
66 Ibid, p. 430. 
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‘Preceding pages have discussed lines of public policy: they have been concerned 
only incidentally with the actions of individuals. The emphasis has fallen on what 
the State has attempted to do rather than on what entrepreneurs have done. The 
account of events since 1922 has been dominated by the description of what policies 
were pursued by successive governments and why those policies were adopted. A 
reader might be pardoned for wondering if he were reading the economic history of 
a highly centralised and socialist State rather than of an unintegrated society which 
has chosen parliamentary democracy for its form of government and the 
maintenance of private property for its social inspiration. But we are indeed dealing 
with the affairs of the parliamentary Republic of Ireland, not with those of a People’s 
Republic.’69  
Why has the focus in the literature been on policy and the role of the State? Is it the nature of 
the sources available, or is it an omission of individual action? Perhaps these are questions that a 
non-State focused economic history or business history more generally could address. 
Conclusion 
Finally, does Irish economic history matter and can we learn anything from Ireland’s 
economic history since independence?  
Nick Crafts forcibly argues that economic history can be important but in order live up to its 
potential it must learn from its component parts, economics and history, and be hypothesis-led 
and policy orientated rather than focusing on existing historiography.70 In a similar vein, Charles 
Read has also highlighted the importance of economic history in some of the core debates in 
modern economics, relating to debt and growth, causation and the euro area.71 In this Journal, 
Graham Brownlow has argued against a return to historicism in (Irish) economic history. 
However, Brownlow also highlighted the limits of a dogmatic approach that assumes a universal 
economic theory, instead he argues for a more flexible methodology incorporating a hypothetico-
deductive approach.72 Yet, in contrast to Brownlow, Crafts, and Read, Bielenberg and Ryan (p.5) 
have adopted a more historicist approach in their study as they argue that ‘economic 
development can be most readily explained in historical terms, rather than adhering to conceptual 
models that have a tendency to be undermined by new directions in the national and 
international economy.’  In a sense, this harks back to the earlier historicist approach adopted by 
Meenan that placed history at the centre of his work on the Irish economy. He noted that ‘Irish 
economics have been deeply influenced by the manner in which the Irish people have reacted to, 
and against, their history.’73 The hypothesis-driven approach (hypothetico-deductive) advocated 
by Crafts was adopted by Kennedy et al. and Ó Gráda, thus suggesting a shift in scholarship.  
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70 Nick Crafts, ‘Economic History Matters’, Centre for Comparative Advantage in the Global Economy 
working paper no. 58 (2011), 
 http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/onlinepublications/archive/ 
[accessed 18 June 2015]   
71 Charles Read, ‘Economic History is Dead; Long Live Economic History?’, The Economist, 7 April 2015: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/04/economics-and-history  [accessed 10 June 
2015] 
72 Graham Brownlow, ‘How to do we Ensure a Useful Future for Irish Cliometrics?’ Irish Economic and 
Social History, 39 (2012). 
73 Meenan, The Irish Economy since 1922, p. xxvii 
14 
 
Elsewhere, Barry Eichengreen argues that economic history can be useful when there are 
time constraints on the collection and analysis of information. In this scenario, historical analogy 
may be a good form of reasoning in the absence of deductive and inductive reasoning. However, 
Eichengreen argued that analogies between the 2008 crisis and the Great Depression were used, 
not because it was necessarily the best but because it was well known. Eichengreen also makes 
the point that the present shapes how we interpret the past and that new directions in scholarship 
can be influenced by current debates.74  
This brings us on to the role of an historian in analysing past government economic policy. 
Gerschenkron argued that ‘all decisions in the field of economic policies are essentially decisions 
with regard to combinations of a number of relevant factors. And the historian’s contribution 
consists in pointing at potentially relevant factors and at potentially significant combinations 
among them which could not be easily perceived within a more limited sphere of experience 
[italics sic.]’.75 Thus, how we interpret the past then becomes important; policymakers reading 
Bielenberg and Ryan will acquire convenient analogies to help make decision in future crises but 
they may not necessarily get the best analogies. Instead, future scholars may find interesting case 
studies and epochs to peruse and help develop greater understanding of the Ireland’s economic 
history that may help better inform future policy.  
Only time will tell whether the next instalment in the analysis of Ireland’s economy history 
adopts an inductive, deductive or analogical approach. 
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